

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

October 19, 2007

TO: K. Fortenberry, Technical Director
FROM: R. Quirk and W. Linzau, Hanford Site Representatives
SUBJECT: Activity Report for the Week Ending October 19, 2007

W. Linzau was out of the office this week.

Waste Treatment Plant (WTP): The contractor determined that a large number of prefabricated pipe segments that were procured for installation in the black cells of the Pretreatment Facility (PT) and High Level Waste Facility (HLW) may not have been procured with clearly understood testing and documentation requirements. The specification was intended to require the vendor to perform 100 percent volumetric testing of all girth welds on these black cell piping segments, but an inadequate specification appears to have caused confusion. The concern was raised six months ago as a result of a contractor review of corrective actions for a previous problem with the testing of these pipe segments, but it was not until the last few weeks that significant attention from senior contractor managers raised the visibility of this problem. Both contractor and senior Office of River Protection (ORP) Managers are now engaged with this issue. This problem raises questions concerning the clarity of engineering documents used for procurement and the adequacy of the corrective action program.

Tank Farms: The site rep observed the presentation of proposed S-102 spill corrective actions to the Executive Safety Review Board (ESRB). The corrective actions addressed the problems noted in the Type A investigation, the various reviews performed by the contractor, and a report from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Safety Management and Operations (EM-60). The senior contractor managers provided guidance on the changes they desired. The plan was approved after the schedule for completion of a number of commitments was made more aggressive. These corrective actions for the Type A investigation will be combined with those developed by the Project Hanford Management Contractor and will be submitted to ORP next week.

Richland Operations Office (RL): The site rep observed the final qualification oral board for R. Johnson as a facility representative in the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The questions selected and asked by the board were appropriate. With this qualification, RL again has three fully qualified facility representatives at PFP.

River Corridor Closure Project: RL issued the report on their periodic assessment of emergency preparedness and identified seven deficiencies, six weaknesses, and six good practices. The contractor's ability to respond to an emergency has improved since July when they sent RL a letter committing to improve their emergency management program. Several of the findings and deficiencies are related to the immaturity of the program.